DNS is a directory, not proof of safety
A domain resolving tells you it exists. It tells you nothing about whether it is safe.
Anybody can register a name, obtain a certificate for it within minutes and have a padlock in the address bar. The padlock means the connection is encrypted and the name matches, not that the people behind it are honest. Advice built on "look for the padlock" was reasonable when certificates were slow and expensive to get, and stopped being useful once they became free and instant.
More on DNS and domains
- DNSSEC signs answers but does not hide themA sealed postcard
- Encrypted DNS protects the resolver path, not the destinationCovered to the desk, open to the door
- Registrar compromise can outrank server securityIt all hangs from one fitting
- Registrar locks add friction to domain theftThe pin that makes them stop
- Dangling DNS can point to somebody else's resourceYour plate, their locker
- Subdomain takeover begins with abandoned ownershipNobody minding the stall