Route leaks can be accidental and disruptive
Most routing incidents are mistakes rather than attacks.
An operator announces routes they should not have, others accept them, and a large amount of the internet's traffic briefly takes a detour through somewhere unexpected. There is rarely any intent. The effect can still be an outage or an interception opportunity, which is why filtering at the edges matters even between parties who trust each other.
More on Internet routing
- BGP announces reachability, not truthA claim, not a proof
- BGP hijacking can redirect traffic before applications see itThe points move under the train
- RPKI validates route origins, not the whole pathOnly the first pair of hands is signed for
- More specific Internet routes usually winThe narrower claim takes it
- Anycast sends one address to multiple placesOne address, many doorsteps
- Route filtering is Internet hygieneWe all drink from the same main